A “20/20” Vision: Supreme Court of Missouri Revisits Admissibility of Eyewitness Expert Testimony After More Than 30 Years by Miller, Emily
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 86 Issue 3 Article 11 
Summer 2021 
A “20/20” Vision: Supreme Court of Missouri Revisits 
Admissibility of Eyewitness Expert Testimony After More Than 30 
Years 
Emily Miller 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Emily Miller, A “20/20” Vision: Supreme Court of Missouri Revisits Admissibility of Eyewitness Expert 
Testimony After More Than 30 Years, 86 MO. L. REV. () 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol86/iss3/11 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 





A “20/20” Vision: Supreme Court of 
Missouri Revisits Admissibility of 
Eyewitness Expert Testimony After More 
Than 30 Years 
State v. Carpenter, 605 S.W.3d 355 (Mo. 2020) 
Emily Miller* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since 1989 the admissibility of expert testimony regarding 
eyewitness identifications has been unaddressed in Missouri’s courts.1  
During this time, over 2,000 scientific studies have illustrated the 
fallibility of eyewitness testimony.2  The United States Supreme Court has 
long recognized the “vagaries” of eyewitness identification and the real 
potential for erroneous identifications leading to wrongful convictions.3  
Most recently, advanced capabilities with DNA evidence have highlighted 
the tragic consequences of erroneous eyewitness identification.4  Indeed, 
 
* B.S. Economics, Emporia State University, 2018; J.D. Candidate, University of 
Missouri School of Law, 2022; Associate Managing Editor, Missouri Law Review, 
2021–2022.  I would like to thank Professor Rodney Uphoff for his expertise and 
guidance during the writing of this Note, as well as the Missouri Law Review for its 
help in the editing process. 
 1. State v. Carpenter, 605 S.W.3d 355 (Mo. 2020) (en banc); State v. Whitmill, 
80 S.W.2d 45 (Mo. 1989) (en banc); State v. Lawhorn, 762 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. 1988) 
(en banc). 
 2. “The volume of that research has been remarkable: over two thousand studies 
on eyewitness memory have been published in a variety of professional journals over 
the past 30 years.” Report of the Special Master at 9, State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 
(2011) (No. 62,218) (available at 
https://www.physics.smu.edu/pseudo/Eyewitness/NJreport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YDL6-C7Z7]). 
 3. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967) (“The vagaries of 
eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with 
instances of mistaken identification.”). 
 4. Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Evidence: Improving Its Probative Value, 7 
PSYCH. SCI. IN THE PUB. INT. 45, 48 (2006), 
1
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a now often-cited fact: Of the 375 exonerations since 1989, nearly seventy 
percent involved wrongful convictions founded at least in part on 
eyewitness identification.5   
One method used to combat erroneous eyewitness identification is 
expert testimony.6  Two Supreme Court of Missouri decisions from the 
late 80s, however, State v. Lawhorn and State v. Whitmill, regularly 
allowed Missouri’s appellate courts to affirm trial court decisions 
excluding expert testimony related to eyewitness identification.7  In State 
v. Carpenter, the Supreme Court of Missouri revisited the standard of 
admissibility for expert testimony on eyewitness identification, holding 
that its earlier decisions no longer controlled.8  The decision in State v. 
Carpenter is significant, as it changes a long-standing precedent and aligns 
Missouri’s approach to eyewitness expert testimony with the majority of 
the country.9   
The Court’s holding in Carpenter is a much-needed improvement for 
defendants seeking to admit eyewitness expert testimony.  This Note 
argues, however, that in the larger scheme of combatting erroneous 
eyewitness identification and subsequent wrongful convictions, Carpenter 
is only one step.  Part II of this Note provides Carpenter’s procedural 
background and the Supreme Court of Missouri’s holding.  Then, Part III 
explains the fallibility of eyewitness identifications and outlines the legal 
framework of various safeguards that are designed to combat such 
fallibility.  Part IV details the Carpenter majority’s departure from 
Missouri’s long-standing precedent and ultimate conclusion that the trial 
court erred when it excluded eyewitness expert testimony.  Finally, Part V 
posits additional measures that Missouri should take, including providing 
more informative jury instructions and implementing identification 
procedure reform.  
 
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1529-1006.2006.00027.x 
[https://perma.cc/NYC8-N32Z] (“Rather, the advent of forensic DNA testing has 
changed the way the legal system views eyewitness evidence.”). 
 5. Eyewitness Identification Reform, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
https://www.innocenceproject.org/eyewitness-identification-reform/ 
[https://perma.cc/43JL-E7PZ] (last visited Apr. 12, 2021). 
 6. State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 696 (Or. 2012) (“[E]xpert testimony is one 
method by which the parties can educate the trier of fact concerning variables that can 
affect the reliability of eyewitness identification.”). 
 7. State v. Lawhorn, 762 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. 1988) (en banc); State v. Whitmill, 
780 S.W.2d 45, 46 (Mo. 1989) (en banc). 
 8. State v. Carpenter, 605 S.W.3d 355, 359 (Mo. 2020) (en banc). 
 9. Id.; Commonwealth v. Walker, 92 A.3d 766, 782 (Pa. 2014) (noting that 
forty-four states permit expert testimony on eyewitness identifications “for the 
purpose of aiding the trier of fact in understanding the characteristics of eyewitness 
identification”). 
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
On the evening of October 23, 2016, Jacob Williams, a young white 
man, walked down Capitol Avenue in Jefferson City, Missouri listening 
to music on his headphones.10  In the darkness, dimly lit by a streetlight 
some distance away, Williams noticed two black men approaching.11  The 
men wore hoodies pulled low over their faces and quickly overtook 
Williams.12  Williams tried to cross the street to avoid the men, but they 
blocked his path, one standing in front of Williams and the other behind.13   
The assailant in front of Williams demanded to use Williams’s phone, 
but Williams said he did not have one and explained that his music was 
playing on an iPod.14  The assailant lifted his shirt, revealing what 
Williams believed was a pistol tucked into the man’s waistband, and 
ordered Williams to “[g]ive me what you have, or I’ll shoot you.”15  He 
took Williams’s iPhone and headphones while the other assailant grabbed 
Williams’s e-cigarette and nicotine cartridge.16  The two men fled.  The 
encounter lasted less than one minute.17 
Williams tried to follow the men, but lost sight of them as they ran 
toward an alley.18  Williams asked a nearby couple to use their phone to 
report the robbery. While on the phone, Williams reported to the 911 
operator that two young black men, one in a red hoodie and one in a black 
hoodie, had accosted him in the street.19  Five minutes elapsed between 
Williams first noticing his assailants and officers arriving on scene.20  
Moments later, a sergeant drove by the alley where Williams had last seen 
his attackers.21  The sergeant stopped his car when he saw Carpenter and 
another young black man and asked to speak with them.22  Carpenter 
stopped immediately, while the other young man took a few steps as if he 
might run, before stopping as well.23  The sergeant found an iPhone, with 
headphones still attached, near to the place Carpenter was standing.24  The 
sergeant asked other responding officers to bring Williams to where he 
 
 10. Carpenter, 605 S.W.3d at 357. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
3
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had found Carpenter and the other young man to see if Williams could 
identify them as the robbers.25  The officers drove Williams to the 
sergeant’s location and informed him that he would see the potential 
robbers and be asked if he recognized them.26  When Williams arrived, an 
officer shone a spotlight on the two young men who were now handcuffed 
and seated on the curb.27  From the car, and less than ten minutes after the 
crime was committed, Williams confirmed that the two men were the 
robbers.28 Williams specifically identified Carpenter as the man who 
threatened him with a pistol but noted Carpenter was not wearing the red 
hoodie he wore during the robbery.29  Carpenter and his companion were 
placed under arrest.30   
Carpenter was charged with one count of first-degree robbery.31  The 
prosecution’s case against him was predominately, but not completely, 
built on Williams’s “show up” identification.32  Before trial, Carpenter’s 
counsel gave notice that he would call an expert witness, Dr. James 
Lampinen, to testify about the factors that can impact eyewitness 
reliability.33  The state successfully moved to exclude the expert, arguing 
such testimony should be inadmissible under State v. Lawhorn and its 
progeny.34   
At trial, Williams testified that he was “one hundred percent certain” 
Carpenter was the man who had threatened and robbed him.35  Carpenter’s 
counsel again sought to admit Dr. Lampinen’s testimony, but the circuit 
court sustained the State’s objection.36  After the close of all evidence, the 
judge instructed the jury using Missouri Approved Instruction–Criminal 
(“MAI-CR”) 310.02, which lists seventeen factors juries should consider 
when evaluating an eyewitness identification.37  The jury found Carpenter 
guilty of first-degree robbery.38  Carpenter appealed, claiming the circuit 
 
 25. Id. at 357–58. 
 26. Id. at 358. 
 27. Id. at 358. 
 28. Id. at 358. 
 29. Id. at 358. 
 30. Id. at 358. 
 31. Id. at 356. Victim confirmed the iPhone was his as he was able to unlock it 
with his fingerprint. Id. at 358. Additionally, Victim’s e-cigarette and nicotine 
cartridge were found in the alley where Victim had seen the two men running, along 
with the driver’s license of the young man that was with Defendant.  Id.  Right off the 
alley, one black hoodie and one red hoodie were found.  No pistol was ever found.  Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 358. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 358 n.1. 
 38. Id. at 358. 
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court erred in excluding Dr. Lampinen’s expert testimony.39  The Supreme 
Court of Missouri granted transfer, holding that the trial court abused its 
discretion in excluding Dr. Lampinen’s testimony and, moreover, that 
Lawhorn and its progeny were no longer controlling precedent. It held 
instead that RSMo § 490.065.2, enacted in 2017, governed the issue.40   
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Erroneous eyewitness identification has become ubiquitously known 
as the leading cause of wrongful convictions.41  As a result, over time, the 
criminal justice system has implemented safeguards designed to mitigate 
inaccurate identifications and prevent wrongful convictions when 
misidentifications do occur.42  This Part briefly addresses the fallibility of 
eyewitness identification and discusses two safeguards – jury instructions 
and eyewitness expert testimony – focusing on the development of 
Missouri law regarding each.   
A. Memory: Malleable and Fallible 
An understanding of memory – the way in which the mind stores and 
recalls information – is essential to the study of eyewitness identification.43  
Elizabeth Loftus, a leading expert on false memories and eyewitness 
misidentification, describes memory like a “Wikipedia page,” that is, 
“[Y]ou can go in there and change it, but so can other people.”44  This 
notion, however, is counterintuitive; people believe memory functions like 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 356–57, 359. 
 41. State v. Guilbert, 49 A.3d 705, 729–30 (Conn. 2012); State v. Henderson, 27 
A.3d 872, 878 (N.J. 2011) (“Indeed, it is now widely known 
that eyewitness misidentification is the leading cause of wrongful convictions across 
the country.”). 
 42. Henderson, 27 A.3d. at 912 (“Beyond the scientific community, law 
enforcement and reform agencies across the nation have taken note of the scientific 
findings. In turn, they have formed task forces and recommended or implemented new 
procedures to improve the reliability of eyewitness identifications.”).    
 43. See Cara Laney & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony and Memory 
Biases, NOBA, https://nobaproject.com/modules/eyewitness-testimony-and-
memory-biases [https://perma.cc/EL83-5QSJ] (last visited Apr. 18, 2021) (“In 
addition to correctly remembering many details of the crimes they witness, 
eyewitnesses often need to remember the faces and other identifying features of the 
perpetrators of those crimes. Eyewitnesses are often asked to describe that perpetrator 
to law enforcement and later to make identifications from books of mug shots or 
lineups.”).  
 44. TED, How reliable is your memory? Elizabeth Loftus, YOUTUBE (Sep. 23, 
2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PB2OegI6wvI [https://perma.cc/3C38-
UQAJ] (comment starts at 5:25). 
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a videotape, “accurately and thoroughly capturing and reproducing a 
person, scene, or event.”45 Research, however, shows otherwise, that 
memory is instead “a constructive, dynamic and selective process.”46 
Specifically, the memory process is split into three stages: encoding, 
storage, and retrieval.47  Encoding is the process by which an individual 
takes in and learns of information.48  Next, storage describes the process 
of retaining encoded information in an individual’s memory and the 
amount retained.49  Lastly, retrieval involves accessing stored 
information.50   
In the context of eyewitness identification, various factors can impact 
one or multiple stages of the memory process and affect the accuracy of 
identification.51  These are categorized into “estimator” variables and 
“system” variables.52  Estimator variables are those beyond the control of 
law enforcement,53  for example, the cross-race effect: the race of the 
victim compared to the race of the perpetrator; the weapon-effect: whether 
the perpetrator used a weapon; and the confidence of the eyewitness in his 
or her identification.54  In contrast, system variables are within the control 
of law enforcement and involve the procedures for obtaining an 
eyewitness identification.55  For example, whether police use a line-up or 
show-up, line-up construction, blind administration, and pre-identification 
instructions are all factors controlled by law-enforcement authorities that 
may affect the accuracy of an eyewitnesses’ identification.56 
 
 45. Report of the Special Master, supra note 2, at 9 (“The central precept is that 
memory does not function like a videotape, accurately and thoroughly capturing and 
reproducing a person, scene or event . . . Memory is, rather, a constructive, dynamic 
and selective process.”). 
 46. Id. (emphasis added). 
 47. How Memory Works, HARVARD UNIV., https://bokcenter.harvard.edu/how-
memory-works [https://perma.cc/RNK5-H6LH] (last visited Apr. 23, 2021). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Report of the Special Master, supra note 2, at 10 (“At each of those stages, 
the information ultimately offered as ‘memory’ can be distorted, contaminated and 
even falsely imagined.”). 
 52. Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, 54 ANN. REV. 
PSYCHOL. 277, 279 (2003).  Professor Gary Wells first used these terms in the 1970s 
when the breadth of research that exists today was just spring boarding. See Gary L. 
Wells, Applied Eyewitness-Testimony Research: System Variables and Estimator 
Variables, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1546, 1548 (1978). 
 53. Report of the Special Master, supra note 2, at 11–12. 
 54. Miko M. Wilford & Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness System Variables, in REFORM 
OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES 23, 25 (B. L. Cutler ed., 2013). 
 55. Wells & Olson, supra note 52, at 279.  
 56. Id. 
6
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Although the general fallibility of eyewitness testimony is commonly 
known, studies continually show jurors do not understand why memory 
can be unreliable.57  Without understanding the particular factors affecting 
eyewitness identification accuracy, jurors do not know how to assess a 
particular eyewitness’s testimony.58 
1. Estimator Variables 
Some estimator variables, such as the quality of lighting at the 
witnessed event or the distance from which the victim viewed the 
perpetrator, and their potential impact are more intuitive.59  Others are 
more difficult to understand and explain.60   
First, the cross-race effect – also known as “Other-Race Effect” or 
“Own-Race Bias” – describes the phenomenon that individuals are better 
at remembering the faces of individuals of the same race.61  Indeed, studies 
consistently show eyewitnesses are more likely to falsely identify a 
 
 57. State v. Guilbert, 49 A.3d 705, 723 (Conn. 2012) (“Although the[] findings 
[regarding the variables] are widely accepted by scientists, they are largely unfamiliar 
to the average person, and, in fact, many of the findings are counterintuitive.”); see 
Tanja Rapus Benton et al., Eyewitness Memory is Still Not Common Sense: 
Comparing Jurors, Judges and Law Enforcement to Eyewitness Experts, 20 APPLIED 
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 115, 116 (2006); Richard S. Schmechel et al., Beyond the Ken? 
Testing Jurors’ Understanding of Eyewitness Reliability Evidence, 46 JURIMETRICS 
177, 193–198 (2006); Elizabeth F. Loftus et al., EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND 
CRIMINAL 1 (4th ed. 2007). 
 58. State v. Clopten, 223 P.3d 1103, 1108 (Utah 2009); State v. Lawson, 291 
P.3d 673, 696 (Or. 2012) (“[M]any of the system and estimator variables that we 
described earlier are either unknown to the average juror or contrary to common 
assumptions[.]”). 
 59. State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 910 (N. J. 2011) (“Some of the findings 
[factors] described above are intuitive. Everyone knows, for instance, that bad lighting 
conditions make it more difficult to perceive the details of a person’s face. Some 
findings are less obvious.”). 
 60. Report of the Special Master, supra note 2, at 48 (“Studies examining 
whether and to what extent jurors (or potential jurors) know or correctly intuit the 
findings reported in the eyewitness identification literature report that laypersons are 
largely unfamiliar with those findings and often hold beliefs to the contrary.”) (“The 
2006 study, comparing juror acceptance of the same research findings (24T 57-62), 
found that jurors were substantially less receptive to such concepts as cross-race bias 
(90% acceptance by experts, 47% by jurors), weapons focus (87% by experts, 39% by 
jurors), weak correlation between confidence and accuracy (87% by experts, 38% by 
jurors), and memory decay (83% by experts, 33% by jurors.”)); Guilbert, 49 A.3d at 
723 (“Although the[] findings [regarding the variables] are widely accepted by 
scientists, they are largely unfamiliar to the average person and, in fact, many of the 
findings are counterintuitive.”). 
 61. John C. Brigham et al., The Influence of Race on Eyewitness Memory, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS PSYCHOLOGY 257, 257–58 (David F. Ross et al. eds., 
2006). 
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perpetrator of another race.62  Studies also show, however, that jurors do 
not understand the cross-race effect.  For example, in one study, forty-
eight percent of potential jurors believed that cross-race and same-race 
identifications were equally reliable, and eleven percent believed cross-
race identifications could actually be more reliable. 
Second, the presence of a weapon at the witnessed event negatively 
impacts the accuracy of subsequent identifications.63  The literature terms 
this the “weapon-focus effect.”64  Specifically, studies explain that the 
“visible presence of a weapon diverts a witness’s attention away from the 
face of the perpetrator and reduces the witness’s ability to encode, describe 
and identify the face.”65  A third factor, related to the weapon-focus effect, 
is the stress of an event.  The highly stressful nature of victimization can 
decrease the reliability of an eyewitnesses’ identification.66  While the 
individual may not forget the event itself, highly stressful events can 
interfere with the encoding process.67   
Finally, one common misconception is that the level of confidence an 
eyewitness expresses when testifying at trial is a reliable predictor of the 
accuracy of the identification.68  This relationship, termed the confidence-
accuracy relationship, hypothesizes that as an individual’s confidence in 
the identification increases, so does the likelihood of its accuracy.69  The 
reality, however, is that confidence and accuracy are only weakly 
correlated.70  This fallacy is particularly concerning, as research shows 
 
 62. Report of the Special Master, supra note 2, at 48. 
 63. Id. at 44. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 43.  The scientific literature reports that, while moderate levels of stress 
improve cognitive processing and might improve accuracy, an eyewitness under high 
stress is less likely to make a reliable identification of the perpetrator.  Id. 
 67. Report of Special Master, supra note 2, at 43. Stress and fear ensure that the 
witness will not forget the event, but they interfere with the ability to encode reliable 
details.  Id. “The effect of stress is illustrated in a 2004 field study involving 500 
active-duty military personnel in a survival- school program, who were subjected to 
12 hours of confinement followed by two 40-minute interrogations, one under high 
stress with physical confrontation and the other under low stress, conducted by 
different interrogators.  When asked the following day to identify their interrogators, 
the participants correctly identified the high- stress interrogator at only half the rate 
they identified the low-stress interrogator; some, indeed, were even unable to identify 
the high-stress interrogator’s gender.” Id. 
 68. Id. at 50 (“What jurors primarily rely on in assessing identification accuracy 
is the confidence expressed by the witness in the identification, although, as previously 
discussed, the literature demonstrates that the confidence/accuracy correlation is weak 
at best and that confidence is highly malleable.”). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
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jurors primarily rely on an eyewitness’s expressed confidence when 
assessing that witness’s testimony.71   
2. System Variables 
System variables include all the ways that law enforcement retrieves 
and records a witness’ memory.72  One system variable with significant 
influence on the accuracy of identifications includes the type of 
identification procedure used: show-up, line-up, or photo array.73   
A show-up occurs when a police officer takes a witness to a location 
to show the witness an apprehended suspect.74  Show-ups are different than 
other identification procedures, such as line-ups or photo arrays, because 
show-ups involve only one suspect.75  Frequently, the suspect is already 
handcuffed or in the back of a police car when the witness arrives.76  As 
the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized there is a “commonsense 
notion that one-on-one show-ups are inherently suggestive . . . because the 
victim can only choose from one person, and, generally, that person is in 
police custody.”77   
B. Safeguards 
This Section will address the legal framework regarding safeguards 
against misidentification and resulting wrongful convictions, including 
jury instructions and eyewitness expert testimony generally and will also 
describe Missouri law concerning each.   
1. Jury Instructions 
Jury instructions are one safeguard designed to protect against the 
fallibility of eyewitness identification.  The United States Supreme Court 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. The Science Behind Eyewitness Identification Reform, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
https://innocenceproject.org/science-behind-eyewitness-identification-reform/ 
[https://perma.cc/AH5U-VPXZ] (last visited July 26, 2021). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Eyewitness Identification, CALIFORNIA INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
https://californiainnocenceproject.org/issues-we-face/eyewitness-identification/ (last 
visited April 25, 2021). 
 75. Report of the Special Master, supra note 2, at 29 (“A showup is an 
identification procedure in which just a single suspect is presented to the witness.”). 
 76. Eyewitness Identification, supra note 74. 
 77. State v. Herrera, 902 A.2d 177, 183 (N.J. 2006); NATIONAL RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT: ASSESSING EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 31 
(2014) (“The U.S. Supreme Court, in its 1977 ruling in Manson v. Brathwaite, set out 
the modern test under the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution that regulates 
the fairness and the reliability of eyewitness identification evidence.”). 
9
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has recognized the value of, but not mandated, the use of jury instructions 
for this purpose.78  State courts vary as to whether a jury instruction should 
be given and,79 when given, how comprehensive the instruction should 
be.80  New Jersey – whose jury instruction Missouri later considered using 
to model its own – believes that a comprehensive jury instruction, which 
thoroughly explains factors affecting eyewitness reliability, should be 
mandated in all cases involving eyewitness identification.81  Indeed, in 
State v. Henderson, the New Jersey Supreme Court revised its legal 
framework regarding eyewitness identification including adopting a 
comprehensive cautionary jury instruction and mandating its use in all 
cases with an eyewitness identification.82   
In 2016, Missouri adopted Missouri Approved Instruction-Criminal 
310.02, which apprises the jury of seventeen factors to consider when 
evaluating eyewitness testimony.83  Initially, Missouri considered 
patterning its instruction after that in State v. Henderson.  Ultimately, 
however, Missouri pared down the instruction to a version that provided 
less explanation.84 
2. Expert Testimony 
Expert testimony is an additional method to inform jurors of 
particular factors that contribute to the unreliability of eyewitness 
identification.85  Before 1983, however, courts regularly excluded 
eyewitness expert testimony.86  In fact, before 1983, every reported 
 
 78. See Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 233 (2012); see also U.S. v. 
Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 558 (Dist. Ct. App. D.C. 1972). 
 79. See WILLIAM CARROLL & MICHAEL SENG, Jury Instructions, in Eyewitness 
Testimony: Strategy and Tactics § 9:5 (2d ed. 2009) (comparing state court approaches 
to the use of jury instructions for eyewitness testimony). 
 80. State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 925–27 (N. J. 2011) (comprehensive jury 
instructions); see also MASS. COURT SYS, MODEL EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 
INSTRUCTION 9.160 1–11 (2015) (comprehensive jury instructions). 
 81. State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 928. 
 82. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT: ASSESSING 
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 34–35 (2014) (discussing jury instructions in 
Henderson). 
 83. Mo. Jury Instr. Crim. MAI-CR 310.02 [2016 New] Eyewitness Identification 
Testimony. 
 84. Tricia Bushnell & Amol Sinha, Show Me Real Eyewitness ID Reform, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (2016). 
 85. Com. v. Walker, 92 A.3d 766, 784 (Pa. 2014). 
 86. State v. Lawhorn, 762 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Mo. 1988) (en banc) (noting that 
“[a]lmost uniformly, state and federal courts have upheld the trial court’s exercise of 
discretion to exclude expert testimony on eyewitness identification…” and collecting 
cases); see also Com. v. Francis, 453 N.E.2d 1204, 1210 (Mass. 1983) (collecting 
cases). 
10
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appellate opinion to consider the admissibility of eyewitness expert 
testimony upheld a trial court’s decision to exclude it.87  Some courts 
prohibited eyewitness expert testimony altogether,88 while other courts left 
trial judges with discretion on the issue.  Even under the latter approach, 
trial judges often excluded such testimony.89  Courts’ usual justifications 
for excluding eyewitness expert testimony included that it invaded the 
province of the jury, the testimony’s subject matter was within the 
common knowledge of jurors, and/or cross-examination, as well as 
opening and closing arguments, adequately protected the defendant.90  
Today, however, the national trend shows states are more frequently 
allowing experts to testify as to the unreliability of eyewitness 
identification.91  Many state supreme courts have overturned years of case 
law supporting an absolute prohibition of defendants’ attempts to admit 
eyewitness expert testimony.92  Additionally, courts have repeatedly 
invalidated the formerly proffered justifications for excluding eyewitness 
expert testimony.  
Despite this trend, for over thirty years, Missouri’s case law has 
consistently excluded expert testimony regarding eyewitness 
identification.  In State v. Lawhorn, the Supreme Court of Missouri 
considered, as an issue of first impression, whether a trial court had abused 
its discretion in excluding the defendant’s expert testimony on the 
reliability of eyewitness identification.93   
In Lawhorn, the defendant, on trial for first-degree burglary, sought 
to introduce expert testimony to explain how the other-race effect, the 
effects of the passage of time, stress at the time of the crime, and how the 
human brain retrieves memories of facial recognition combine to diminish 
a witness’s ability to make an accurate identification.94  The court 
 
 87. HON D. DUFF MCKEE, 35 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 1 (Originally published 
in 1996); State v. Chapple, 660 P.3d 1208, 1224 (Ariz. 1983) (en banc) (first appellate 
decision holding that the trial court’s exclusion of expert eyewitness testimony was 
abuse of discretion). 
 88. See Walker, 92 A.3d at 775. 
 89. See Lawhorn, 762 S.W.2d at 822–23. 
 90. Id. at 823 (“We believe, however, that such matters are within the general 
realm of common experience of members of a jury and can be evaluated without an 
expert’s assistance.”); State v. Kemp, 507 A.2d 1387, 1390 (Conn. 1986) (“The 
weaknesses of identifications can be explored on cross-examination and during 
counsel’s final arguments to the jury.”). 
 91. See, e.g., Com. v. Gomes, 22 N.E.3d 897, 910 (Mass. 2015); State v. Guilbert, 
49 A.3d 705, 730–31 (Conn. 2012); People v. LeGrand, 867 N.E.2d 374, 375–76 
(N.Y. Ct. App. 2007); U.S. v. Graves, 465 F. Supp. 2d 450, 460 (E.D. Pa. 2006); see 
also Com. v. Walker, 92 A.3d 766, 782–83 (Pa. 2014) (collecting cases). 
 92. See Walker, 92 A.3d at 783–84 (2014) (collecting state supreme court 
decisions abandoning the absolute exclusion of eyewitness expert testimony). 
 93. Lawhorn, 762 S.W2d at 822. 
 94. Id. at 822–23. 
11
Miller: A “20/20” Vision: Supreme Court of Missouri Revisits Admissibilit
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,
988 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
articulated that eyewitness expert testimony is admissible if it is clear that 
the subject of the testimony is one upon which the jurors, for want of 
experience or knowledge, would otherwise be incapable of drawing a 
proper conclusion from the facts in evidence.95  Otherwise, if expert 
testimony will not assist the jury or if it unnecessarily diverts the jury’s 
attention from relevant issues, it should be excluded.96  Additionally, the 
court posited that “expert testimony is also inadmissible if it relates to the 
credibility of witnesses, for this constitutes an invasion of the province of 
the jury.”97 
Applying this framework, the court concluded the subject of 
Lawhorn’s expert’s testimony was “within the general realm of common 
experience of members of a jury and can be evaluated without an expert’s 
assistance.”98  The court also thought that cross-examination would 
adequately expose any issues with the eyewitness’ identification and that 
the issue could be reiterated in closing arguments.99  Thus, the Missouri 
court ultimately held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
excluding the expert testimony.100  
One year later, the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed Lawhorn’s 
holding in State v. Whitmill.101  In Whitmill, the court described Lawhorn 
as holding that a trial court “may, in its discretion,” exclude expert 
testimony regarding the credibility of eyewitness identifications.102  
Despite the purported “wide discretion” given to a trial judge, Lawhorn 
and Whitmill, when applied, created a near-per se ban on eyewitness expert 
testimony.103   
Most recently, in 2017, Missouri enacted Missouri Revised Statute 
Section  490.065.2 as the new standard for the admissibility of expert 
testimony in civil and criminal cases.104  In American jurisprudence, the 
admissibility of expert testimony is predominately governed by either the 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 823. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. State v. Whitmill, 780 S.W.2d 45, 47 (Mo. 1989) (en banc). 
 102. Id. 
 103. See State v. Carpenter, 605 S.W.3d 355, 359 (Mo. 2020) (en banc) 
(“After Lawhorn, such evidence has routinely–if not uniformly –been excluded.”). 
 104. Tim McCurdy, Missouri Adopts Daubert: Sea Change or Ripple on the 
Pond?, MISSOURI BAR BLOG (April 25, 2021, 11:00 AM), https://burgerlaw.com/wp-
content/uploads/2020/03/missouri-adopts-daubert.pdf [https://perma.cc/V2MQ-
4JZH]. The new law signed by Gov. Greitens adopts verbatim the language of FRE 
702. Id. The new language combined with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence dating 
back to Daubert will raise the standard required for parties to introduce expert 
testimony. Id. 
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Frye or Daubert standard.105  Before 2017, in criminal cases, Missouri 
courts applied Frye when determining the admissibility of expert 
testimony.106  Section 490.065.2, however, was an exact codification of 
the Daubert standard. 107  Despite this change, it was unclear whether 
courts would begin to admit eyewitness expert testimony.  After all, 
Lawhorn already purported to leave the decision within the judge’s 
discretion.108  Thus, while Section 490.065.2 would now apply to expert 
testimony in criminal cases, this did not guarantee a change in outcome 
for the admissibility of eyewitness expert testimony.109   
IV. INSTANT DECISION 
In State v. Carpenter, the majority quickly ushered Lawhorn v. State 
and its progeny away, asserting they no longer controlled the admissibility 
of eyewitness expert testimony because they were abrogated in 2017 by 
Missouri’s enactment of Section 490.065.2.110  Judge Wilson, writing for 
 
 105. See generally MARGARET A. BERGER, THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT 
TESTIMONY 12 (2011). Under Frye, an expert opinion is admissible if the scientific 
technique on which the opinion is based is “generally accepted” as reliable in the 
relevant scientific community. Id. In contrast, under Daubert,  a trial judge takes the 
role of a “gatekeeper” and must consider factors such as 1) whether the expert’s 
technique or theory can be tested and assessed for reliability, 2) whether the technique 
or theory has been subject to peer review and publication, 3) the known or potential 
rate of error of the technique or theory, 4) the existence and maintenance of standards 
and controls, and 5) whether the technique or theory has been generally accepted in 
the scientific community.  Anjelica Cappellino, Daubert vs. Frye: Navigating the 
Standards of Admissibility for Expert Testimony, EXPERT INST. (July 24, 2020), 
https://www.expertinstitute.com/resources/insights/daubert-vs-frye-navigating-the-
standards-of-admissibility-for-expert-testimony/ [https://perma.cc/CNG3-SK28]. 
 106. McCurdy, supra note 104. 
 107. MO. REV. STAT. § 490.065.2 (2017). The new law signed by Gov. Greitens 
adopts verbatim the language of FRE 702 The new language combined with the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence dating back to Daubert will raise the standard required 
for parties to introduce expert testimony. Gary Burger, New Expert Rules under HB 
153 and other Expert tips (May 2017), https://burgerlaw.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/expert_presentation.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LE9-ZX9X]. 
 108. State v. Lawhorn, 762 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Mo. 1988) (en banc). 
 109. MO. REV. STAT. § 490.065.2. 
 110. State v. Carpenter, 605 S.W.3d 355, 359–60 (Mo. 2020) (en banc). In his 
dissenting opinion, Judge W. Brent Powell, joined by Judge Zel M. Fischer, agreed 
with the majority that Lawhorn and its progeny were abrogated by § 490.065.2, but 
opined that the exclusion was valid on independent grounds. Id. at 371 (Powell, J., 
dissenting).  Specifically, Judge Powell noted that expert testimony is admissible if it 
will “help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”  
Id. Judge Powell also noted that a trial court does not abuse its discretion by rejecting 
an offer of proof if it includes admissible and inadmissible evidence. Id. Judge Powell 
said that “[w]hile some of Dr. Lampinen’s testimony may have been admissible, 
portions of his testimony would not have assisted the jury in understanding the 
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the majority,111 then summarized Section 490.065.2 by stating that expert 
testimony is admissible when it is based on sufficient facts and reliable 
principles that have been reliably applied if such testimony helps the jury 
understand the evidence and decide contested issues.112  Specifically, the 
court clarified that, whereas in Lawhorn, expert testimony was admissible 
only if the jury could not proceed in its absence, under Section 490.065.2, 
the only question is whether expert testimony helps the jury.113 
The majority then proceeded to apply Section 490.065.2 to the facts 
of the case.114  First, the court emphasized it did not need to question, nor 
did the State, whether the reliability requirements of Section 
490.065.2(1)(b)-(d) were met, in light of the “unanimous” conclusion, 
“near perfect scientific consensus,” and “widespread judicial recognition” 
that eyewitness identification is potentially unreliable.115   
Next, the court addressed whether, under Section 490.065.2, Dr. 
Lampinen’s testimony would have helped the jury evaluate and 
understand the eyewitness identification testimony.116 The state argued the 
jury was capable of assessing the eyewitness identification without Dr. 
Lampinen’s testimony because jurors are familiar with the factors 
affecting eyewitness reliability.117  In response, the court acknowledged 
that under the Lawhorn framework – where the court need not admit expert 
testimony unless the jury could not proceed without testimony – this 
argument may have worked.118  But under Section 496.065.2, the only 
question is whether the expert testimony helps the jury.119  The court 
emphasized that jurors rarely know that eyewitness identifications are 
unreliable, and often, the science runs contrary to jurors’ commonsense 
understandings.120  Thus, the majority ultimately rejected the State’s 
argument and concluded that the expert testimony would help the jury.121 
Second, the State argued that credibility assessments are solely 
within the province of the jury.122  The court also rejected this argument, 
 
evidence at hand.” Id. As an example, Judge Powell said Lampinen’s proffered 
testimony addressed the effects of impaired eyesight on eyewitness identification, 
which was not relevant to Carpenter’s case. Id. Therefore, Judge Powell concluded 
that the proffered testimony was inadmissible. Id. 
 111. Id. at 356 (majority opinion). 
 112. Id. at 360. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 361. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 362. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 363. 
 122. Id. 
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explaining that the State conflated credibility and accuracy.123  The court 
explained that while it is true that it is solely within the jury’s province to 
decide whether a witness is telling the truth or attempting to mislead – 
credibility – eyewitness expert testimony explains the factors that cause an 
eyewitness to believe he is telling the truth but be wrong – inaccuracy.124  
Ultimately, the question Dr. Lampinen would have helped the jury decide 
was not whether Williams was telling the truth but whether Williams’s 
identification was accurate.125  
V. COMMENT 
This case represents a long-overdue change in how the Supreme 
Court of Missouri views eyewitness expert testimony and finally brings 
Missouri into alignment with the vast majority of states.  This Part 
discusses the positive change that State v. Carpenter represents, considers 
the practical effect of this precedent for defendants, and suggests there still 
is a need for further reform.  
A. What Changed? 
In both State v. Lawhorn and State v. Carpenter, the court held that 
whether an eyewitness expert may testify is a decision left within the 
discretion of a trial judge.126  So then, why is Carpenter’s holding 
significant?   
While it purported to give trial judges broad discretion regarding the 
admissibility of eyewitness experts, Lawhorn, in effect, completely barred 
expert testimony, at least as to certain subject matter.127  Specifically, in 
Lawhorn, the proffered expert testimony included factors such as the 
cross-race effect, the impact of the stress of an event, and the effect of the 
passage of time.128  Once Lawhorn excluded this testimony, those subjects 
were repeatedly held to be “within the common knowledge” of the jury, 
meaning experts could not testify to them.129  But, if these factors – which 
studies repeatedly show jurors do not understand – were considered to be 
within the common knowledge of jurors, what kind of information would 
be outside common knowledge?130 
 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 363–64. 
 125. Id. 
 126. State v. Lawhorn, 762 S.W.2d 820, 828 (Mo. 1988) (en banc); Carpenter, 
605 S.W.3d at 370. 
 127. Lawhorn, 762 S.W.2d at 823. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Carpenter, 605 S.W.3d at 360. 
 130. Id. at 363 n.5. 
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Ultimately, the change Carpenter spurred stems from finally 
acknowledging the breadth of scientific literature that has long shown the 
factors Lawhorn repeatedly categorized as “within the common 
experience” of jurors are in fact not understood by jurors.131  Moreover, 
Carpenter admitted Lawhorn’s conflation of accuracy and reliability.132  
This decision finally abandons Lawhorn’s flawed rationale, and, for 
defendants with the capability of proffering expert testimony, it opens the 
door for an opportunity to have such testimony admitted.133   
B. Beyond Carpenter, Further Reform is Needed 
There are various advantages and disadvantages to jury instructions 
and expert testimony, respectively.  While this Part does not argue one 
safeguard is superior to the other, it focuses on two considerations: (1) 
many defendants, even those erroneously accused, opt for plea deals, 
which renders the availability of jury instructions or expert testimony 
moot, and (2) many defendants cannot afford expert testimony.  
Consequently, Missouri must implement reforms to its identification 
procedures.  Additionally, practically, more defendants may benefit from 
the accessibility of jury instructions.  Therefore, Missouri needs to revise 
its existing jury instruction to better inform jurors of the way factors 
impact the reliability of eyewitness identification.   
1. Shortcomings of Expert Testimony and Jury Instructions 
First, expert testimony and jury instructions, both potentially 
effective methods for limiting the effect of erroneous eyewitness 
identifications, only benefit defendants at trial.134  Yet the vast majority of 
defendants never go to trial but, instead, opt for plea deals.135  Indeed, even 
 
 131. Lawhorn, 762 S.W.2d at 823; Carpenter, 605 S.W.3d at 360. 
 132. Carpenter, 605 S.W.3d at 362. 
 133. Id. at 370. 
 134. Svein Margnussen, et. al., An Examination of the Causes and Solutions to 
Eyewitness Error, FRONTIERS IN PSYCHIATRY (Aug. 13, 2014), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4131297/ [https://perma.cc/3FA9-
YMYD] (discussing how jury instructions and expert testimony do not help jurors 
accurately assess eyewitness identification and emphasizing the importance of a 
safeguard that attacks the source of the problem rather than post misidentification). 
 135. See Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, THE NEW YORK 
REVIEW (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-
innocent-people-plead-guilty/ [https://perma.cc/9ZL9-23KT] (“In 2013, while 8 
percent of all federal criminal charges were dismissed (either because of a mistake in 
fact or law or because the defendant had decided to cooperate), more than 97 percent 
of the remainder were resolved through plea bargains, and fewer than 3 percent went 
to trial. The plea bargains largely determined the sentences imposed.  While 
corresponding statistics for the fifty states combined are not available, it is a rare state 
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falsely accused individuals plead guilty rather than risk going to trial.136  
In the plea context, jury instructions and expert testimony are irrelevant, 
which emphasizes the necessity of a safeguard that prevents 
misidentifications in the first place. 
Second, experts are costly, not only for defendants, but for all parties 
involved in the adjudication process.137  While the expense of experts 
should not devalue the importance of eyewitness expert testimony,138 the 
reality is that many defendants cannot afford experts.139  Additionally, 
defendants typically do not have a constitutional right to expert 
testimony.140  Therefore, for the indigent defendant, it is unclear whether 
State v. Carpenter warrants much celebration.141   
2. Identification Procedure Reform 
Certainly, expert testimony and jury instructions are important 
safeguards designed to mitigate the effect of misidentifications and help 
the jury detect when the likelihood of misidentification is high.142  But, 
 
where plea bargains do not similarly account for the resolution of at least 95 percent 
of the felony cases that are not dismissed . . . .”). 
 136. See id. (“Third, and possibly the gravest objection of all, the prosecutor-
dictated plea bargain system, by creating such inordinate pressures to enter into plea 
bargains, appears to have led a significant number of defendants to plead guilty to 
crimes they never actually committed. For example, of the approximately three 
hundred people that the Innocence Project and its affiliated lawyers have proven were 
wrongfully convicted of crimes of rape or murder that they did not in fact commit, at 
least thirty, or about 10 percent, pleaded guilty to those crimes.”). 
 137. Identifying the Culprit: Assessing Eyewitness Identification, NATIONAL 
RESEARCH COUNCIL 40 (2014), https://www.nap.edu/catalog/18891/identifying-the-
culprit-assessing-eyewitness-identification [https://perma.cc/5M3M-KER6] (select 
“read online”). 
 138. Id. at 39 (“Expert testimony on eyewitness memory and identifications has 
many advantages over jury instructions as a method to explain relevant scientific 
framework evidence to the jury: (1) Expert witnesses can explain scientific research 
in a more flexible manner, by presenting only the relevant research to the jury; (2) 
Expert witnesses are familiar with the research and can describe it in detail; (3) Expert 
witnesses can convey the state of the research at the time of the trial; (4) Expert 
witnesses can be cross-examined by the other side; and (5) Expert witnesses can more 
clearly describe the limitations of the research.”). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. (“In Ake v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court held that an indigent defendant 
has a constitutional due process right to assistance by an expert witness only if that 
expert assistance is so crucial to the defense (or such a ‘significant factor’) that its 
denial would deprive the defendant of a fundamentally fair trial.”). 
 141. See State v. Carpenter, 605 S.W.3d 355 (Mo. 2020) (en banc). 
 142. Amy Cynkar, Order in the Court, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION 
(June 2007), https://www.apa.org/monitor/jun07/order [https://perma.cc/P8LP-
ZNZF]. 
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identification procedures are front-end safeguards that seek to prevent 
misidentification to begin with.143   
In 1999, the Department of Justice published a comprehensive guide 
for law enforcement, which covered procedures aimed at obtaining more 
accurate eyewitness identifications.144  Since then, twenty-four states have 
implemented identification procedure reform.145  In 2016, Missouri 
proposed, but did not pass, Senate Bill 842, which would have required 
statewide adoption of the best practices for identification procedures.146  
The bill’s failure is unfortunate as “[t]he most potent means available to 
the legal system to reduce eyewitness error is to conduct proper eyewitness 
interviews and identification procedures.”147  Indeed, “[i]t is much easier 
to prevent eyewitness errors than to detect them once they have 
occurred.”148 
3. Improved Jury Instruction 
Jury instructions, unlike expert testimony, are readily available and 
not costly.149  In fact, in State v. Henderson, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
preferred jury instructions over expert testimony as a reform measure for 
these very reasons.150  Regardless of whether one views expert testimony 
or jury instructions as superior, when used, courts should seek to maximize 
the efficacy of each.   
 
 143. Id. (“Judge and jury education, however, is only part of the solution, says 
Wells. Going to the source of the problem-improving how police conduct eyewitness 
interviews and identification procedures-may hold the best chances for reducing false 
convictions, he says.”). 
 144. Report of the Special Master, supra note 2, at 52 (“In 1999, based on the work 
of the Technical Working Group, the NIJ published its Guide of best practice 
recommendations for law enforcement, which was followed in 2003 by the Training 
Manual. Both Guide and Manual were distributed to law enforcement agencies 
nationwide.”). 
 145. Eyewitness Identification Reform, supra note 5 (“These states are: California, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Vermont, West 
Virginia and Wisconsin.”). 
 146. S. 842, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2016). 
 147. Margnussen, supra note 134. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id.; see also State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 925 (N.J. 2011) (noting 
enhanced jury instructions, are “focused and concise, authoritative (in that juries hear 
them from the trial judge, not a witness called by one side), and cost-free”); State v. 
Carpenter, 605, S.W.3d 355, 368 (Mo. 2020) (en banc) (“This Court hoped, when it 
approved this instruction, that defendants could obtain the benefit of this science 
without the delay and expense of having to adduce expert testimony in each case.”). 
 150. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 925. 
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Currently, Missouri’s jury instruction apprises the jury of seventeen 
factors it may consider when evaluating an eyewitness’s testimony.151  
Specifically, the instruction provides:  
Eyewitness identification must be evaluated with particular care. In 
order to determine whether an identification made by a witness is 
reliable or mistaken, you should consider all of the factors mentioned 
in Instruction No. 1 concerning your assessment of the credibility of 
any witness. You should also consider the following factors.  
One, the witness’s eyesight; 
Two, the lighting conditions at the time the witness viewed the person 
in question; 
Three, the visibility at the time the witness viewed the person in 
question; 
Four, the distance between the witness and the person in question; 
Five, the angle from which the witness viewed the person in question;  
Six, the weather conditions at the time the witness viewed the person 
in question;  
Seven, whether the witness was familiar with the person identified;  
Eight, any intoxication, fatigue, illness, injury or other impairment of 
the witness at the time the witness viewed the person in question;  
Nine, whether the witness and the person in question are of different 
races or ethnicities;  
Ten, whether the witness was affected by any stress or other distraction 
or event, such as the presence of a weapon, at the time the witness 
viewed the person in question;  
Eleven, the length of time the witness had to observe the person in 
question;  
Twelve, the passage of time between the witness’s exposure to the 
person in question and the identification of the defendant;  
Thirteen, the witness’s level of certainty of [his] [her] identification, 
bearing in mind that a person may be certain but mistaken;  
 
 151. MAI-CR 310.02, supra note 83. 
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Fourteen, the method by which the witness identified the defendant, 
including whether it was  
[i. at the scene of the offense;]  
[ii. (In a live or photographic lineup.) In determining the reliability of 
the identification made at the lineup, you may consider such factors as 
the time elapsed between the witness’s opportunity to view the person 
in question and the lineup, who was in the lineup, the instructions 
given to the witness during the lineup, and any other circumstances 
which may affect the reliability of the identification;]  
[iii (In a live or photographic show-up.) A “show-up” is a procedure 
in which law enforcement presents an eyewitness with a single suspect 
for identification. In determining the reliability of the identification 
made at the show-up, you may consider such factors as the time 
elapsed between the witness’s opportunity to view the person in 
question and the show-up, the instructions given to the witness during 
the show-up, and any other circumstances which may affect the 
reliability of the identification;]  
Fifteen, any description provided by the witness after the event and 
before identifying the defendant;  
Sixteen, whether the witness’s identification of the defendant was 
consistent or inconsistent with any earlier identification(s) made by the 
witness; and  
Seventeen, [other factors.] [any other factor which may bear on the 
reliability of the witness’s identification of the defendant.]  
It is not essential the witness be free from doubt as to the correctness 
of the identification. However the state has the burden of proving the 
accuracy of the identification of the defendant to you, the jury, beyond 
a reasonable doubt before you may find [him] [her] guilty.152  
These instructions, however, fail to adequately explain how the 
factors may impact the reliability of an eyewitness.153  For example, factor 
 
 152. Id. (endnotes omitted). 
 153. Elizabeth F. Loftus, Juries Don’t Understand Eyewitness Testimony, NEW 
YORK TIMES (Sept. 1, 2011), 
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/08/31/can-we-trust-eyewitness-
identifications/juries-dont-understand-eyewitness-testimony 
[https://perma.cc/BQB7-4NXX] (“Psychological scientists have long known that 
many jurors hold misconceptions about the accuracy of eyewitness testimony and the 
specific ways it can go awry.”); Margnussen, supra note 134 (“Lastly, jurors have 
trouble integrating their knowledge of eyewitness factors into the facts of a criminal 
case”). 
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nine alludes to the cross-race effect by instructing the jury to consider the 
respective race of the defendant and the eyewitness.154  But, how does a 
juror know which way this factor cuts?  If the perpetrator and the 
eyewitness are of the same race, does this indicate that identification is 
more likely to be accurate or inaccurate?  And, studies repeatedly show 
that jurors do not understand how race affects the accuracy of 
identifications.155  Additionally, factor ten advises of “stress” and that the 
jury ought to consider the “presence of a weapon.”156  Yet, again, this does 
not tell the jury whether this factor tends to make an eyewitness 
identification more or less accurate.  Indeed, Carpenter recognized 
“[n]othing in MAI-CR 310.02 tells the jury whether the presence of a 
particular factor increases or decreases reliability, and nothing in that 
instruction explains to the jury why these factors have the effect they do 
or how they can interact.”157  
The use of jury instructions and expert testimony is premised on the 
idea that jurors do not understand how or the degree to which various 
factors affect eyewitness testimony.158  And, importantly, many factors are 
actually counterintuitive.159  For example, one may think that if an event 
is highly stressful, one is more likely to remember it accurately.160  Thus, 
while factor ten tells the juror to consider stress, an uninformed juror might 
believe that, when a weapon is present, an eyewitness is likely to have 
better remembered a perpetrator due to extreme stress – a conclusion 
contrary to scientific consensus.161  Missouri’s eyewitness instruction may 
alert the jury to a checklist, but does not indicate whether checking off 
certain factors indicates the juror should be more suspicious of the 
identification or believe that it is likely to be more accurate.   
The scientific community has relentlessly sought to help the criminal 
justice system understand that jurors, attorneys, and even judges, do not 
know why eyewitness testimony is more likely to be inaccurate in a 
 
 154. MAI-CR 310.02, supra note 83. 
 155. Loftus, supra note 153 (“For example, many respondents believed that a 
cross-racial identification (identifying a stranger of a different race) would be just as 
reliable as or even more reliable than a same-race identification.”). 
 156. MAI-CR 310.02, supra note 83. 
 157. State v. Carpenter, 605 S.W.3d 355, 368 (Mo. 2020) (en banc). 
 158. See State v. Guilbert, 49 A.3d 705, 731 n.32 (Conn. 2012). 
 159. Benton, supra note 57. 
 160. State v. Guilbert, 49 A.3d 705, 724 (Conn. 2012) (“Similarly, the average 
person is likely to believe that eyewitnesses held at gunpoint or otherwise placed in 
fear are likely to have been acutely observant and therefore more accurate in their 
identifications.”).  
 161. Id. at 732 (recognizing “high stress at the time of observation may render a 
witness less able to retain an accurate perception and memory of the observed 
events”). 
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particular case.162  Unfortunately, the factors listed in MAI-CR 310.02, 
without giving the juror an indication of how to consider each factor, are 
not sufficiently informative.163 
Considered solely for its improvement to the admissibility standard 
for eyewitness expert testimony, State v. Carpenter certainly moved 
Missouri law in the right direction.164  But when taking a broader view and 
considering the entirety of Missouri’s jurisprudence and general criminal 
justice schema for combatting the leading cause of wrongful convictions 
– erroneous eyewitness testimony – State v. Carpenter is but a step. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
State v. Carpenter represents a massive change in attitude toward 
eyewitness expert testimony and exposes the weaknesses in Missouri’s 
general schema for combatting erroneous eyewitness identification.  
Despite the positive step Carpenter takes, expert eyewitness testimony 
alone is insufficient to protect against the fallibility of eyewitness 
identification.  Missouri must not let another thirty years pass before 
addressing other safeguards designed to protect defendants from 
misidentification.  Instead, Missouri should proactively implement 




 162. See Kate A. Houston, et. al., Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Evidence: In 
Search of Common Sense, BEHAV. SCI. LAW (2013), 
http://www.pc.rhul.ac.uk/sites/rheg/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Houston-Hope-
Memon-and-Read-20132.pdf [https://perma.cc/DG5A-VCGK]. 
 163. MAI-CR 310.02, supra note 83. 
 164. State v. Carpenter, 605 S.W.3d 355 (Mo. 2020) (en banc). 
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